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Abstract
Utilizing complex dynamics of chaotic maps and systems in encryption was studied comprehensively in the past two and a
half decades. In 1989, Fridrich’s chaotic image encryption scheme was designed by iterating chaotic position permutation
and value substitution some rounds, which received intensive attention in the field of chaos-based cryptography. In 2010,
Solak et al. proposed a chosen-ciphertext attack on the Fridrich’s scheme utilizing influence network between cipher-pixels
and the corresponding plain-pixels. Based on their creative work, this paper scrutinized some properties of Fridrich’s scheme
with concise mathematical language. Then, some minor defects of the real performance of Solak’s attack method were given.
The work provides some bases for further optimizing attack on the Fridrich’s scheme and its variants.
Keywords: Chaotic encryption, chosen-ciphertext attack, cryptanalysis, differential attack.
1. Introduction
The complex dynamics of chaotic systems attracts re-
searchers to utilize them as a new way to design secure
and efficient encryption schemes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. The first
chaos-based encryption scheme was proposed in 1989 [7],
where a chaotic equation
g(x) = (β + 1)(1 + 1/β)βx(1 − x)β, β ∈ [1, 4] (1)
was derived to generate pseudo-random number sequence
and then mask the plaintext with modulo addition. Soon
after publication of [7], it was pointed out that period of
the sequence generated by iterating Eq. (1) may be very
short, especially when it is implemented with small com-
puting precision, which may seriously compromise the se-
curity level of the scheme [8]. Some special defects and
properties of chaotic systems may facilitate cryptanalysis
of chaos-based encryption schemes, e.g. chaotic synchro-
nization [9], chaotic ergodicity [10], and parameter identifi-
cation of chaotic system [11]. The inadequate combination
of chaotic dynamics and encryption architectures makes the
complexity of recovering its secret key from some pairs of
plain-texts and the corresponding cipher-texts, encrypted
with the same secret key, lower than that of brute-force
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attack [12, 13, 14, 15]. Some general rules on evaluating
security of chaos-based encryption schemes can be found
in [16, 17].
As quantitatively analyzed in [18, 19], any position
permutation-only encryption scheme can be efficiently bro-
ken with only O(dlogL(H · W)e) known/chosen plaintexts
and the computational complexity of magnitude O(H ·W ·
dlogL(H · W)e), where L denotes the number of different
gray-values of the plaintexts, and H × W (height×width)
is the size of the encryption scheme’s permutation domain
, whose every element denotes the mapping relation be-
tween the relative position of a permuted element in the
plaintext and that in the corresponding ciphertext. As sug-
gested in [20], iterating position permutation and value sub-
stitution sufficient rounds can make an encryption scheme
very strong against all kinds of attacks. Considering signif-
icant impact of the structure of Fridrich’s scheme on a great
number of chaotic encryption schemes, Solak’s chosen-
ciphertext attack method proposed in [21] can be consid-
ered as a breakthrough in the field of chaotic cryptanalysis.
According to the record of Web of Science, both pa-
pers [22] and [23] have been cited more than 500 times
up to Aug 2016. Inspired by using space network (func-
tion graph) for attacking hash function in [24], we re-
summarized some properties of Fridrich’s chaotic image
encryption scheme with the methodology of complex net-
works (binary matrix). Then, we further evaluated the real
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performance of Solak’s chosen-ciphertext attack method
and found that it owns some minor defects. In addition,
the performance of extension of the attack idea to Chen’s
scheme proposed in [23, 25] was also briefly evaluated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
concisely introduces Fridrich’s chaotic image encryption
scheme. Our cryptanalytic results of the scheme are pre-
sented in Sec. 3 in detail. The last section concludes the
paper.
2. Fridrich’s chaotic image encryption scheme
The plaintext encrypted by Fridrich’s chaotic image en-
cryption scheme is a gray-scale image of size H × W 1,
which can be denoted by a sequence of length HW in do-
main Z256, I = [I(i)]HW−1i=0 , by scanning it in the raster order.
The corresponding cipher-image is I′ = [I′(i)]HW−1i=0 . The
framework of Fridrich’s scheme can be described as fol-
lows.
• Encryption procedure:
1) Position Permutation: for i = 0 ∼ HW − 1, do
I∗(w(i)) = I(i), (2)
where permutation matrix W = {w(i)}HW−1i=0 satisfies
w(i1) , w(i2) for any i1 , i2.
2) Value Substitution: for i = 0 ∼ HW − 1, carry out
substitution function
I′(i) = I∗(i) g(I′(i − 1)) h(i), (3)
where a  b = (a + b) mod 256, g: Z256 → Z256 is a
fixed nonlinear function, H = {h(i)}HW−1i=0 is a pseudo-
random number sequence, and I′(−1) is a pre-defined
parameter c.
3) Repetition: set I = I′ and repeat the above two steps
for r−1 times, where r is a predefined positive integer.
• Decryption procedure: it is similar to the encryption
procedure except that the two main encryption steps
are carried out in a reverse order, the permutation ma-
trix W is replaced by its inverse, and Eq. (3) is re-
placed by equation
I∗(i) = I′(i) g(I′(i − 1)) h(i), (4)
where (a b) = (a − b + 256) mod 256.
1For simplicity, use HW to denote H ·W.
Incorporating Eq. (2) into Eq. (3), one can get
I′(i) = I(w−1(i)) g(I′(i − 1)) h(i), (5)
where W−1 = {w−1(i)}HW−1i=0 is the inverse of W. Combining
Eq. (2) and Eq. (4), one has
I(i) = I′(w(i)) g(I′(w(i) − 1)) h(w(i)). (6)
Since publication of [22], a great number of methods have
been proposed to modify some elements of the framework
of Fridrich’s scheme from various aspects, such as using
novel methods to generate the permutation matrix; defining
new concrete function g in Eq. (3); changing the involved
operations in the substitution function.
3. Cryptanalysis
To facilitate further security analysis of Fridrich’s
scheme, we re-present some properties of Fridrich’s
scheme reported in [21, Sec. 3] with the methodology
of matrix theory. Some critical details are appended to
make their description complete, especially the conditions
in Property 3 were found by us in the experiments.
3.1. Some properties of Fridrich’s scheme
Property 1. There exists influence path between the i-th
pixel of I and the j-th one of I′ (the value of the former may
be influenced by that of the latter) if and only if
(T̂)r(i, j) > 0,
where T̂ = P · T,
P(i, j) =
1 if j = w(i);0 otherwise,
and
T =

1
1 1 0
1 1
0 . . . . . .
1 1

HW×HW
.
Proof. First, we consider the case when r is equal to one.
Observing Eq. (4), one can see that relation between I∗ and
I′ can be presented by the matrix T: the value of the i-
th pixel of I∗ is influenced by that of the j-th one of I′ if
T(i, j) > 0 and not otherwise, where
T(i, j) =
1 if 0 ≤ i − j ≤ 1;0 otherwise. (7)
2
Permutation operation in Eq. (2) can be presented as multi-
plication of the permuted vector and an elementary matrix:
I∗ = I · P. (8)
So, one can assure that the value of the i-th pixel of I may
be influenced by that of the j-th pixel of I′ if T̂(i, j) > 0 and
not otherwise. Note that the influence may be cancelled by
the modulo operation in Eq. (6). If r > 1, one can easily
derive that the value of i-th pixel of I is influenced by that
of the j-th one of I′ if and only if(
T̂
)r
(i, j) > 0.
Property 2. If w(x) + 1 = w(y), w(y) + 1 = w(z), difference
of two sets of entries of
(
T̂
)r
is a subset of another similar
set:
{ j | (T̂)r(y, j) > 0}\{ j | (T̂)r(x, j) > 0} ⊂
{ j | (T̂)r(z, j) > 0}, (9)
where x, y, z ∈ ZHW .
Proof. From the definition of matrix multiplication and
matrix (7), one has
(T̂)r(x, j)
=
HW∑
k=1
T̂(x, k) · (T̂)r−1(k, j)
=
HW∑
k=1
HW∑
l=1
P(x, l) · T(l, k) · (T̂)r−1(k, j)
=
HW∑
k=1
P(x,w(x)) · T(w(x), k) · (T̂)r−1(k, j)
=
HW∑
k=1
T(w(x), k) · (T̂)r−1(k, j). (10)
As T(w(x), k) = 0 when k < {w(x) − 1,w(x)}, one can get
the following two points when r > 1:
• (T̂)r(x, j) > 0 if and only if (T̂)r−1(w(x), j) > 0 or
(T̂)r−1(w(x) − 1, j) > 0 when w(x) , 0;
• (T̂)r(x, j) > 0 if and only if (T̂)r−1(w(x), j) > 0 when
w(x) = 0.
This means that
{ j | (T̂)r(x, j) > 0}
=

{ j | (T̂)r−1(w(x), j) > 0} if w(x) = 0;
{ j | (T̂)r−1(w(x), j) > 0}∪
{ j | (T̂)r−1(w(x) − 1, j) > 0} otherwise.
(11)
Since w(y) , 0, w(z) , 0, one can deduce the following
two sets of equations similarly:
{ j | (T̂)r(y, j) > 0}
= { j | (T̂)r−1(w(y), j) > 0}∪
{ j | (T̂)r−1(w(y) − 1, j) > 0},
= { j | (T̂)r−1(w(y), j) > 0}∪
{ j | (T̂)r−1(w(x), j) > 0}, (12)
and
{ j | (T̂)r(z, j) > 0}
= { j | (T̂)r−1(w(z), j) > 0}∪
{ j | (T̂)r−1(w(z) − 1, j) > 0},
= { j | (T̂)r−1(w(z), j) > 0}∪
{ j | (T̂)r−1(w(y), j) > 0}. (13)
Using relation between absolute complement and relative
complement of a set, one can obtain difference of the left
parts of Eq. (12) and Eq. (11),
{ j | (T̂)r(y, j) > 0}\{ j | (T̂)r(x, j) > 0}
=

{ j | (T̂)r−1(w(y), j) > 0}
∩ { j | (T̂)r(x, j) = 0} if w(x) = 0;
{ j | (T̂)r−1(w(y), j) > 0}
∩ { j | (T̂)r−1(w(x), j) = 0}
∩ { j | (T̂)r−1(w(x) − 1, j) = 0} otherwise.
For either case of the above equation, one can get
{ j | (T̂)r(y, j) > 0}\{ j | (T̂)r(x, j) > 0} ⊂
{ j | (T̂)r(z, j) > 0} (14)
by observing the right part of Eq. (13).
Corollary 1. If w(x) = 0, w(y) = 1, then{
j | (T̂)r(x, j) > 0
}
⊂
{
j | (T̂)r(y, j) > 0
}
. (15)
Proof. This corollary can be easily proofed by comparing
Eq. (11) and Eq. (12).
Property 3. If w(0) , 1, |w(x1) − w(x2)| , 1 for any x1, x2
satisfying |x1 − x2| ∈ {1, · · · , 2r−1 − 1}, one has
w(x) = 0,
where the x-th row of (T̂)r is its row vector containing min-
imal number of non-zero element, i.e.,
|{ j | (T̂)r(x, j) > 0}| = min
{
|{ j | (T̂)r(i, j) > 0}|
}HW−1
i=0
, (16)
and r ≥ 2.
3
Proof. As shown in Fig. 1, there exist and only exist
three basic patterns for reducing the number of influenc-
ing cipher-pixels for a plain-pixel. If |w(x1)−w(x2)| , 1 for
any x1, x2 satisfying |x1−x2| ∈ {1, · · · , 2r−1−1}, the first two
patterns in Fig. 1 can be excluded. Furthermore, the third
one can be eliminated if w(0) , 1. (A concrete counter ex-
ample is shown in Fig. 2.) Under the given condition in this
property, there is only one influence path between any pair
of cipher-pixel and plain-pixel. So, the x-th row of (T̂)r has
2r−1 non-zero elements while other rows all have 2r non-
zero elements. Then, one can correctly recover w(x) = 0 by
checking condition (16).
x1 x2x2 x1
5 6k k+1 k k+1 k+2k+2
x1x2
0 1
j j+1 j j+1 j+2j+2 0 1
Figure 1: Three basic patterns for reducing incoming influence
paths of a plain-pixel, where the solid arrow indicates influence
caused by I′(w(i)) and the dashed arrow denotes that caused by
I′(w(i)−1), and the symbol inside a circle denotes the index num-
ber of pixel (the same hereinafter).
0 1 4 5 86 72 3
1 2 5 6 97 83 40 1 4 5 86 72 3
1 2 5 6 97 83 40 1 4 5 86 72 3
1 2 5 6 97 83 40 1 4 5 86 72 3
Figure 2: A counterexample on Property 3, where W =
[1, 3, 7, 5, 0, 2, 8, 4, 6], and r = 3.
3.2. Description of Solak’s chosen-ciphertext attack
To facilitate the discuss in the next subsection, we con-
cisely describe the process of Solak’s chosen-ciphertext at-
tack method given in [21]. Let Wˆ−1 = {wˆ−1(i)}HW−1i=0 denote
the estimated version of W−1. After recovering the approx-
imate version of the influence matrix between cipher-text
and the corresponding plain-text, the Solak’s attack method
prunes the search space of size HW! (factorial of HW) with
the following steps:
• Step 1) Set wˆ−1(0) = x0, where x0 is the row number
satisfying condition (16) itself.
• Step 2) Let wˆ−1(1) = x1, where x1 ∈ A\B, A is the
right-hand set in condition (15) with x = x0, and B =
{x0}.
• Step 3) For i = 2 ∼ HW − 1, let wˆ−1(i) = xi, where
xi ∈ A\B, A is the right-hand set in condition (9) with
x = i−1, y = i, and B = {x j}i−1j=0. If A is empty, one can
assure that the current value of wˆ−1(i−1) is wrong and
process the search with its another candidate value.
• Step 4) Repeat the above steps iteratively till variable
i reaches the maximal value, HW − 1.
3.3. Real performance of Solak’s chosen-ciphertext attack
Observing Eq. (6), one can see that the i0-th plain-pixel
can be only influenced by one cipher-pixel in each encryp-
tion round if w(i0) = 0. After accumulation of r rounds
of encryption, the number of cipher-pixels influencing the
i0-th plain-pixel is smaller than that influencing other plain-
pixels in a very high probability, which serves as the basis
of Step 1). The scope of the former is [1, 2r−1]. In contrast,
the scope of the latter is [r + 1, 2r], whose lower bound
can be achieved when there exist x and t = r satisfying
|w(x + i + 1)−w(x + i)| = 1 for i = 0 ∼ t − 1. Observing the
right part of Fig. 3, one can see that the number of cipher-
pixels influencing the x-th plain-pixel shifts from r +1 to 2r
monotonously when t is increased from 0 to r. Property 3
only presents an extreme condition assuring the estimation
in Step 1) is definitely right. Interestingly, the condition in
Property 3 is very similar to the problem of neighbors re-
main neighbors after random rearrangements, discussed in
[26].
0 1 4 5 139 128 10 116 72 3
1 2 5 6 1410 139 11 127 83 4
14 15
15 160 1 4 5 39 28 0 16 72 3
1 2 5 6 1410 139 11 127 83 4
4 5
15 160 1 4 5 39 28 0 16 72 3
1 2 5 6 1410 139 11 127 83 4
4 5
15 160 1 4 5 39 28 0 16 72 3
0 1 4 5 139 128 10 116 72 3
4 5
14 15
Figure 3: Another counterexample about Property 3.
Now, we give a counterexample to show deficiency of
Solak’s chosen-ciphertext attack method. When W =
4
[1, 3, 5, 7, 2, 4, 6, 8, 0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 9, 15, 14], r = 4, the in-
fluence relation between the cipher-pixels and the corre-
sponding plain-pixels is shown in Fig. 3. Its binary matrix
form is presented in Fig. 4, which demonstrates that the 9-th
row has least non-zero elements. According to Solak’s at-
tack method, one can get w(9) = 0, which is contradict with
the real value. As the initial step has cascaded influence on
the succeeding steps, the attack is totally failed under the
given secret key.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Figure 4: Obtained influence matrix when W = [1, 3, 5, 7, 2, 4,
6, 8, 0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 9, 15, 14], and r = 4.
As shown in [21, Sec. 4], when permutation vec-
tor W = [8, 7, 5, 11, 0, 10, 13, 14, 6, 2, 9, 1, 15, 4, 3, 12] and
r = 3, the permutation vector can be solely recov-
ered with Solak’s chosen-ciphertext attack method. How-
ever, when it is slightly changed as W = [8, 7, 5, 11, 12,
10, 13, 14, 6, 2, 9, 1, 15, 0, 3, 4], eight possible values are
obtained by the attack (See Fig. 5). To verify this point
further, we performed Solak’s attack on a plaintext of size
1 × 32 with 1,000 randomly assigned W and three possible
encryption rounds. The following five cases, in terms of at-
tacking results, were counted: 1) the right key is enclosed;
2) the sole result is the right key; 3) both right key and
wrong key exist; 4) no any result is obtained; 5) all found
results are wrong. Let n1, n2, n3, n4 and n5 denote the num-
ber of the five cases occurring among 1,000 times random
experiments, respectively. The calculated results are shown
in Table 1, which demonstrates that the attack results be-
come more worse as 2r approaches MN more, which agrees
with analysis in the proof of Property 3.
3.4. Real performance of extension of Solak’s attack to
Chen’s scheme
In [21, Sec. 5], it was claimed that Solak’s chosen-
plaintext attack method can be applied to Chen’s scheme
easily and effectively due to similar structure. However, we
found some differences caused by the different basic en-
cryption operations.
[8, 7, 4, 11, 12, 10, 13, 14, 5, 2, 9, 1, 15, 0, 3, 6]
[8, 7, 5, 11, 12, 10, 13, 14, 4, 2, 9, 1, 15, 0, 3, 6]
[8, 7, 5, 11, 12, 10, 13, 14, 6, 2, 9, 1, 15, 0, 3, 5]
[8, 7, 6, 11, 12, 10, 13, 14, 5, 2, 9, 1, 15, 0, 3, 4]
[9, 10, 12, 6, 5, 7, 4, 3, 11, 15, 8, 1, 2, 0, 14, 13]
[9, 10, 11, 6, 5, 7, 4, 3, 12, 15, 8, 1, 2, 0, 14, 13]
[9, 10, 13, 6, 5, 7, 4, 3, 12, 15, 8, 1, 2, 0, 14, 11]
[9, 10, 12, 6, 5, 7, 4, 3, 13, 15, 8, 1, 2, 0, 14, 11]
Figure 5: The results of Solak’s attack when W = [8, 7, 5, 11,
12, 10, 13, 14, 6, 2, 9, 1, 15, 0, 3, 4].
Table 1: The number of five possible cases occurring among 1,000
random secret keys.
r 2 3 4
n1 1000 957 814
n2 964 867 571
n3 36 90 243
n4 0 43 180
n5 0 0 6
In [23, 25], Chen’s scheme changes Eq. (3) as
I′(i) = h(i) ⊕ [I∗(i) h(i)] ⊕ I′(i − 1).
Accordingly, Eq. (4) becomes
I∗(i) = (h(i) ⊕ I′(i) ⊕ I′(i − 1)) h(i). (17)
Combing Eq. (2) and Eq. (17), one has
I(i) = (h(w(i)) ⊕ I′(w(i)) ⊕ I′(w(i) − 1)) h(w(i)). (18)
When W = [1, 3, 5, 7, 2, 4, 6, 8, 0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 9, 15,
14], and r = 4, the number of different influence paths be-
tween a cipher-pixel and any plain-pixel is shown in Fig. 6.
Due to the bitwise exclusive or (XOR) operation used in
Eq. (17), the influence of a cipher-pixel on a influenced
plain-pixel may be cancelled when there is multiple influ-
ence paths between them. So, some influence paths can
not be recovered. Note that even error of one element of
the influence matrix may fail a attacking step based on the
sets comparison and disable the following steps due to the
cascading influence. More discussions on composite func-
tion of modulo addition and XOR operation can be found
in [27, Sec. 3.1]. Figure 7 shows the obtained influence
matrix by changing every cipher-pixel with the fixed value
one, which has six unrecovered influence paths. As the re-
covered influence matrix of sufficient accuracy is requisite
condition for success of the Solak’s attack method, one has
to improve its correct ratio by changing cipher-pixel with
the other values (more cipher-images).
Note that equivalent version of position permutation and
value substitution of 1-round version Chen’s scheme was
5
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 4 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 6 3 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 1 4 3 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 2 5 3 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 1 3 2
Figure 6: The number of different influence paths between the i-
th cipher-pixel and the j-th plain-pixel, where W = [1, 3, 5, 7, 2, 4,
6, 8, 0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 9, 15, 14], and r = 4.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
Figure 7: Obtained influence matrix when W = [1, 3, 5, 7, 2, 4,
6, 8, 0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 9, 15, 14], and r = 4.
successfully recovered with some chosen-plaintexts in [28].
Its weak sensitivity with respect to changes of secret key
and plaintext was demonstrated in detail in [29].
4. Conclusion
Based on the work in [21], this paper formulated some
properties of Fridrich’s chaotic image encryption scheme
with matrix theory and reported some minor defects of So-
lak’s chosen-ciphertext attack method on it. The work may
help designers of chaotic encryption schemes to realize fun-
damental importance of the underlying encryption archi-
tecture for security performance [30]. The following prob-
lems on cryptanalyzing Fridrich’s chaotic image encryption
scheme deserve further investigation: decreasing the re-
quired number of chosen-ciphertext with the special prop-
erties of the influence matrix between cipher-pixels and the
corresponding plain-pixels; reducing computational com-
plexity of the chosen-ciphertext attack; disclosing the influ-
ence matrix under the scenario of known/chosen-plainext
attack.
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